![]() ![]() Bombardini is a native of Italy where she obtained her undergraduate degree at the University of Bologna. Bombardini has studied the organization of interest groups and the behaviour of lobbyists in the US, and has linked the pattern of international trade to the inequality of education outcomes within countries, as well as the effect of international trade on pollution and infant mortality in China and the use of corporate philanthropy as a political tool. Her research focuses on political economy and international trade. Matilde Bombardini is Associate Professor in the Business and Public Policy group at the UC Berkeley Haas School of Business, a fellow of the National Bureau for Economic Research, a fellow of the Institutions, Organizations and Growth group at the Becker Friedman Institute and co-editor of the Journal of International Economics. ![]() We argue that these findings are best explained by investors influencing portfolio firm giving, suggesting that PAC giving may be another means by which influential shareholders impact corporate decision-making, in a manner that amplifies investors’ political voice. Finally, we show that portfolio firms’ PAC expenditure experiences a relatively large shift at the acquisition date relative to past giving, whereas no such pattern is observed for institutional investors. The relationship is stronger for private funds, and those with high partisanship, suggesting the relationship is driven by investor preferences rather than strategic concerns. This increase in similarity of political giving coincides with the election cycle the acquisition takes place in, and is not driven by selection into specific politically strategic acquisitions, as convergence in political behavior is observed even for exogenously determined acquisitions caused by stock index inclusions. Using data on the political giving and ownership of all 13-F investors between 19, we show that the probability that a firm’s Political Action Committee (PAC) donates to a politician supported by an investor’s PAC nearly doubles after the investor acquires a large stake, and that it increases five-fold when the investor obtains a board seat. We show that corporate ownership may be an important mechanism by which institutional investors circumvent such constraints and amplify their influence. Time: 10 :00 a m- 11 :30 p m, October 12 ( Beijing Time )Ĭampaign finance laws aim to limit an individual’s influence over the political process. Speaker: Matilde Bombardini, Associate Professor, University of California Berkeley Haas School of Business We find that only infant mortality related to cardio-respiratory conditions responds to exports shocks, while deaths due to accidents and other causes are not affected.Topic: Investing in Influence: Investors, Portfolio Firms, and Political Giving We find a negative, but insignificant effect on pollution of the dollar-value export shocks, a potential “technique” effect whereby higher income drives demand for clean environment. In particular, she has studied the link between skill distribution and comparative advantage, the lobbying decisions of firms and the behaviour of lobbyists. We show that the channel through which exports affect mortality is pollution concentration: a one standard deviation increase in PollutionExportShock increases SO2 concentration by 5.4 micrograms per cubic meter (the average is around 60). Economist Matilde Bombardini’s research covers various aspects of international trade and political economy. The dollar value of export expansion tends to reduce mortality, but is not always statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in PollutionExportShock increases infant mortality by 2.2 deaths per thousand live births, which is about 13% of the standard deviation of infant mortality change during the period. We find that the pollution content of export affected pollution and mortality. We instrument export shocks using the change in tariffs faced by Chinese producers exporting to the rest of the world. The two measures differ because prefectures specialize in different products: while two prefectures may experience the same shock in dollar terms, the one specializing in the dirty sector has a larger PollutionExportShock. We construct two export shocks at the prefecture level: (i) PollutionExportShock represents the pollution content of export expansion and is measured in pounds of pollutants per worker (ii) ExportShock measures export expansion in dollars per worker. ![]() Has the expansion in exports affected pollution and health outcomes across different prefectures in China in the two decades between 19? We exploit variation in the initial industrial composition to gauge the effect of export expansion due to the decline in tariffs faced by Chinese exporters. ![]()
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